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A LATIN AMERICAN VIEW
RAFAEL VARGAS-HIDALGO*
Three concepts are always present when discussing problems of
Latin American development: economic integration, development plan-
ning and national sovereignty. Despite its ambiguity the concept of sov-
ereignty is still employed by politicians all over the world. Further, con-
siderations based on national sovereignty have prevented the Latin Ameri-
can countries from reaching higher levels of integration or from having
established a system of joint planning.
Discussion will first focus on Latin American integration as a part
of the world's integration processes, giving the main political characteris-
tics of economic integration on this continent. Next, problems of sover-
eignty and integration will be examined. Later the concepts of economic
development planning and joint planning will be analyzed, especially as
they relate to economic integration, national sovereignty and the Latin
American experience.
Economic integration systems and development planning became an
important international phenomenon only after the Second World War.
In Latin America, however, integration systems and development plan-
ning have been practical realities only since the 1960's. The Multilateral
Treaty of Free Trade and Central American Economic Integration (1958),
the Treaty of Economic Association between Honduras, Guatemala and
El Salvador (1960), the Montevideo Treaty (1960), and the General
Treaty of Central American Economic Integration (1960) shaped the
process which created Latin American economic integration.
The Latin American integration process has to be understood as a
part of the efforts of Third World countries to reform the international
*"Licenciado en Ciencias Juridicas, Politicas y Sociales" '71, Catholic Univer-
sity of Chile; LI.M '75, Harvard University; S.J.D. cand., Harvard University;
Associate at the Harvard Center for International Affairs; former Professor at the
Institute for International Affairs of the University of Chile.
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
economic system in order to effect a better distribution of the wealth.
The members of an integration system pursue their own harmonious inter-
dependence as opposed to off-balanced dependence which occurs under
normal conditions. Similarly through their integration systems, the Latin
American countries have sought a self-generating and self-perpetuating
development which would allow them to be free of foreign dependence.
The integration systems among the developing countries are part of
a larger political and economic ideology which is also manifested in
measures such as nationalization of natural resources, regulation of for-
eign capital, technology, royalties, patents and transnational corporations.
In addition, trade barriers protecting national goods are established, State
support is given to national industrialization, development banks of na-
tional or regional character are created, and economic development plan-
ning is implemented. Economic integration systems, such as the Andean
Pact, or Cartagena Agreement,' were designed to incorporate and regulate
these kinds of economic mechanisms harmoniously, cognizant of their
social implications.
Economic integration has been a solution to the old Latin American
problem of disunity. Since the days of Sim6n Bolivar, at the beginning of
the past century, the countries of this continent have aspired to a goal of
unity. 2 The dream for a Latin American unity first emerged in a Hispano-
Americanist ideal of unity at a political level among the Hispano-American
countries. The failure of this effort gave rise to the idea of Pan-American-
ism, whose aim was to achieve commercial and political coordination
as well as economic cooperation among all the countries of the hemisphere,
including North America. Pan-Americanism has been promoted by the
Organization of American States and the Alliance for Progress. The
Hispano-Americanist movement, on the other hand, has been promoted by
sub-regional economic integration systems, such as the Andean Pact, the
Central American Common Market, and the Latin American Free Trade
tSee 1 Inter-American Institute of International Legal Studies: Instruments of
Economic Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean, 175-218 (1975) [here-
inafter referred to as Economic Integration]. For a Spanish text see, Compilaci6n
de Documentos Relacionados con el Acuerdo de Cartagena, 67-94 (1975) [herein.
after referred to as Compilaei6nl.
2For a detailed analysis of the Latin American integration process as well as
for further development of the ideas of "Pan-Americanism," see Vargas - Hidalgo,
The Process of Integration in Latin America, 57 Revista de Derecho Puertorriquefio
(1976). For a Spanish-English version of this article, see 15 Comparative Juridicial
Review (1977).
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Association (LAFTA).2 This Sub-regionaism has had a tendency to ac-
complish at least some degree of economic coordination among countries
in similar economic situations and, therefore, can be seen as a blend of
the contradictions between Hispano-Americanism and Pan-Americanism.
However, this synthesis should be considered as only transitory, since the
ultimate goal is -to establish a Latin American common market through
the convergence of the Andean Pact, the Central American Common Mar-
ket and the Latin American Free Trade Association.
This goal is farther away than was thought during the 1960's. For
example, the Declaration of the Presidents of America (1967) resolved
"to create progressively, beginning in 1970, the Latin American Common
Market, which shall be substantially in operation in a period of no more
than fifteen years."'4 The time period, however, appears to be inaccurate
since the processes of the Andean Pact, the Central American Common
Market and the Latin American Free Trade Association have stagnated.
The Latin American economic integration movement, which has been
attempted through systems of free trade associations, customs unions and
common markets as well as sectorial and frontier integrations, has arisen
principally by the initiative of the Latin American republics themselves.
Nevertheless, especially at its very beginning, foreign influence has also
played an important role. For instance, the example set by the European
Economic Community had great impact in Latin America. In addition, the
United States has prompted, through past positive action and by the way
of a negative response of the Latin American countries to the United
States foreign policy, economic integration. Latin America understood
that economic integration was a necessary tool in order to establish its
political and economic independence from the United States. In spite of
foreign influences, the Latin American economic integration systems are
sui generis. These systems are schemes intended to resolve specific problems
of the Latin American economies. This is especially true with respect to
the Andean Pact whose unique goals and mechanisms make it a remark-
able case of integration effort.
3This study does not include the Caribbean integration process. Although the
Caribbean region and Latin America are geographically near, they represent differ-
ent cultural systems.
4Parts I and II, chapter 1, section 1-a. The Spanish name of this Declaration
is "Declaraci6n de los Presidentes de Amirica." See the text of this document in
56 Dept. of State Bulletin 712-721 (1976); 2 Economic Integration, supra note 1,
at 817-837; Spanish Version, supra note 1, at 35-53.
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Latin American economic integration has been a difficult process.
Dozens of declarations and agreements were the necessary road towards
this objective.' This difficulty is understandable considering the Latin
American countries' sensitivity toward problems of national sovereignty.
However, there is no justification for the unnecessary duplication of ac-
tivities of organs such as S.E.L.A. (Latin American Economics System,
created in 1975) and C.E.C.L.A. (Special Commission of Latin American
Coordination, created in 1964).
Latin American economic integration can be defined as a joint en-
terprise of the Latin American countries which limits the individual na-
tional's sovereignty, and, based on common origin and historical perspec-
tives, tries to achieve the economic and social development of the entire
region and of each of its member countries. This concept requires some
explanations.
The element of joint enterprise in economic integration implies the
creation of a common framework of rules and institutions. This common
framework limits the action of the States while, at the same time, it
creates conditions for harmonious interaction. In this way, the State
agrees to accept limitations on its sovereignty and freedom of action.6
Therefore, integration involves some degree of renunciation of the State's
independence or autonomy, which is in keeping with jurisprudential usage. 7
Let us call this "sovereignty." ' Thus, the integration process supposes
some degree of limitation of sovereignty. 9
In connection with the limitation of national sovereignty, it is neces-
sary to distinguish three stages in the historical and juridical process of
creating political-economic blocs among States. These stages are coopera-
5For a selected collection of these documents, see I & 2 Economic Integration,
supra note 1.
6B. Moore, Algunas Implicaciones del Experimento de Integraci6n Europea, in
Romeo Almeida, Aldo Ferrer, et al., Factores para la Integraci6n Latinoamericana
at 77 (1966) (hereinafter referred to as Factores).
7C. Rousseau, Derecho International Ptdblico 96-97 (3rd ed. 1966).
8See e.g. M. Akehuist, Introducci6n al Derecho Internacional 33-34 (1972).
For a contrary position, see Allan-Randolph Brewer-Carias, Los Problemas
Constitucionales de Ia Integraci6n Econ6mica Latinoamericana 52-58 (1968). The
basis for his position is that sovereignty is a concept which regards the relations
between States and not the relations between the State and the international entity
of which it is a member. Brewer-Carias fails to notice, following his line or argu-
mentation, that to form the international entity the State enters into relations with
other States.
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tion, integration and unification." Cooperation is characterized by a pact
(which can be multilateral or bilateral) through which the parties agree
to jointly carry out some purposes of common interest, while each party
maintains its full sovereignty and freedom. This has been the Latin
American situation especially during the Pan-Americanist period. Integra-
tion is the situation in which the States give up some of their sovereign
prerogatives in order to establish a free trade area, a customs union, a
common market, an economic union or complete economic integration.
The degree of renouncement of sovereignty will vary in accordance with
the object pursued. Unification is the fusion of States which maintain
only some sovereign attributes, mainly of local character, and which adopt
the same policy in all important matters.
The limitation of sovereignty in an integration process has the para-
doxical effect of allowing member countries to increase their independence,
because each State increases its bargaining power and decreases its ex-
ternal dependence by achieving the political, economic and cultural
progress of its people. For this reason, in some countries there is conscious-
ness of the existence of a "common sovereignty" with the other members
of the integration process. This is the case with the Central American
countries, with the exception of Costa Rica. l" For instance, the Constitution
of Honduras states that Honduras is a dis-integrated State of the Federal
Republic of Central America. Therefore, it considers a return to a union
with one or more States of the Old Federation to be an absolute necessity.
In this respect, the Legislative Power is authorized to ratify treaties that
partially or totally try to fulfill this purpose, provided that it is done in a
just and democratic way.12 The Constitution of El Salvador provides that
since El Salvador is a part of the Central American Nation, it is obliged
to support the total and partial reconstruction of the Central American
Republic." Similar provisions are found in the Constitutions of Nica-
ragua 14 and Guatemala." On the other hand, one attribute of sovereignty
is that it allows its own limitations.1
'OSee Factores, supra note 6, at 46.
11I. Saldarriaga, Anotaciones sobre Algunos Problemas Juridicos de Ia Integra-
ci6n Latinoamericana 60 (1971).
I2Const. Honduras, art. 9 (author's translation).
13Const. El Salvador, art. 10 (author's translation).
14Const. Nicaragua, art. 6.
15Const. Guatemala, art. 3.
iGSee, Nationality Decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone) on No.
vember 8, 1921; Advisory Opinion, [19231 P.C.I.J., Ser. B. No. 4.
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Apparently because of that paradoxical effect (increase of independ-
ence) and this juridical attribute (possibity to limit sovereignty) some
authors,' 7 politicians,'8 and jurists do not see any limitation of sovereignty
in participation in an integration system. For instance, the conclusion of
the "Roundtable on the Integration of Latin America and the Question of
Constitutionality" (Universidad Nacional de Colombia, February 6-8,
1967),19 stated in reference to this matter that
[t]he attribution of competence of this kind to such organizations
under conditions of equality and reciprocity, far from impairing or
affecting in any way the national sovereignty proclaimed by all Latin
American constitutions, is in itself a typically sovereign act, inherent
in the joint exercise of sovereignty by various states for the common
welfare of their peoples.20
It is interesting to note that while one interpretation of the idea of
sovereignty gave rise in the nineteenth century to the Latin American
independence movement, 21 another interpretation gives strength to the
twentieth century Latin American economic integration movement. The
first interpretation supported the political independence of the Latin
American people; the second acted as a foundation for economic inde-
pendence.
However, these considerations about sovereignty should not make us
think that integration is a process in which only States can participate.
In fact, it is possible for two or more integration systems to integrate
themselves. This is the case with the Andean Pact, the Central American
Common Market and L.A.F.T.A., which would eventually form the Latin
American Common Market.
17See, e.g. B. Nun, Integraci6n Subregional Andina: Estudio sobre el Acuerdo de
Cartagena 20 (2d ed. 1971).
18See, e.g., the declarations of the President of Paraguay, Alfredo Stroessner,
in the Sixth Meeting of the Assembly of Governors of the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank (April 26, 1965) cited in R. Pastor, Cuenca del Plat; Aspectos Juridi-
cos e Institutionales de un Desarrollo Multinacional 13 (Ediciones Depalmas (1969).
19For the text, see Roundtable on the Integration of Latin America and the
Question of Constitutionality, Inter-American Legal Studies (1968) (hereinafter
Roundtable). Spanish version in Mesa Redonda sobre la Integraci6n de Amrica
Latina y la Cuesti6n Constitucional (1967) (hereinafter Mesa).
2ORoundtable, supra note 19, at 27-28;Mesa, supra note 19, at 25-26.
21For a study of the interpretation of sovereignty as a cause of American inde-
pendence, see J. Eyzaguirre, Ideario y Ruta de ]a Emancipaci6n Americana (Edi-
torial Universitaria 1967).
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LIMITS ON SOVEREIGNTY
"[A] supranational system involves limitations on the exercise of
sovereign attributes or rights of the State which do not require its consent.
This is precisely the essential element and characteristic of supranation-
ality." 22 It is also possible that an integration system does not have
supranationality. In other words, the State limitation of sovereignty does
not necessarily imply. that a supranational body has been formed. In this
respect, the degree of supranationality possessed by the Andean Pact has
been discussed in article 11 which provides that "[t]he Commission shall
adopt its decisions with the aHirmative vote of two thirds of the member
countries."2
3
Equality among States is the basis for their independence, and is one
of the fundamental priciples of international law, especially as stated in
the United Nations Charter.24 Integration limits the sovereignty of the
members, but does not necessarily abolish it. In order to avoid the latter,
it is necessary to maintain some relationship of equality among the
parties. This need for equality has been established in some Latin Amer-
ican Constitutions which deal with the problem of integration and also
in the Cartagena Agreement. Within the integration process, equality
requires consideration of the different levels of development of its mem-
bers. Therefore, if the differences in time periods, procedures or obliga-
tions among the parties are inspired by this concept, we still are facing a
system with uniform means. The Andean Pact, for instance, established
an exhaustive set of rules dealing with the conditions in Bolivia and
Ecuador, which are the relatively less developed countries within the
Andean group.
The recent Cartagena Agreement's crisis (1974-76) which culminated
with Chile's withdrawal from the system in October 1976 shows how
relevant the problem of national sovereignty is in understanding the
functioning of an economic integration system. In fact, all the major
causes of this crisis are related to the issue of sovereignty. Thus, the idea
of national sovereignty was present in the increasing politicization of the
system. Politicization is the process through which conflicting perceptions
22Roundtable, supra note 19, at 37.
23The same provision establishes some exceptions to this rule.
2+The United Nations establishes this principle in article 2, paragraph 1 of its
Charter, and it is confirmed, in one instance, in this article 18, paragraph 1.
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of the common interest within the integration system become more promi-
nent. Member countries began to pay more attention to their particular
economic interests, than to those of the Andean region as a whole; the
parties thought that their national sovereignty allowed them to take this
position. This attitude was most clearly shown by Chile, but it also affected,
to a greater or lesser degree, the other members as well. Also, some
members, especially Bolivia, thought that equality among States was
violated since the distribution of benefits deriving from the integration
system was not uniform. Further, the member countries used the idea of
national sovereignty as a shield in order to avoid the internal implementa-
tion of the Cartagena Agreement's Decisions or the establishment of an
Andean Court.
LEVELS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Criteria have been proposed to distinguish among different levels of
integration. Particularly relevant is Balassa's distinction due to the im-
portance it has bad in Latin America.25 Balassa states that economic
integration
can take several forms that represent varying degrees of integration.
These are a free-trade area, a customs union, a common market,
an economic union, and complete economic integration. In a free-
trade area, tariffs (and quantitative restrictions) between the par-
ticipating countries are abolished, but each country retains its own
tariffs against non-members. Establishing a customs union involves,
besides the suppression of discrimination in the field of commodity
movements within the union, the equalization of tariffs in trade with
non-member countries. A higher form of economic integration is
attained in a common market, where not only trade restrictions but
also restrictions on factor movements are abolished. An economic
union, as distinct from a common market, combines the suppression
of restrictions on commodity and factor movements with some degree
of harmonization of national economic policies, in order to remove
discrimination that was due to disparities in these policies. Finally,
total economic integration presupposes the unification of monetary,
25See, e.g., lnstituto Interamericano de Estudios Juridicos Internacionales, Pro-
blemitiea Juridica e Institucional de la Integraci6n de Amrica Latina; Ensayo de
Sistematizaci6n, 8-17 (Provisional ed. 1967); Factores, supra note 6, at 47-49.
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... fiscal, social, and countercyclical policies and requires the setting-up
of a supra-national authority whose decisions are binding for the
member States.
26
In the Central American Common Market the concepts of free-trade
area, common market, and customs union have a somewhat different
meaning.2 7 Frontier integration, customs preferences, 28 economic com-
munity, and economic fusion 2 9 have also been distinguished. The goals of
integration can also be economic, social, cultural, legal, military and
political. Finally, distinctions can be made between vertical, sectorial or
partial, and horizontal integration.
30
Balassa's distinctions among free-trade areas, customs unions, com-
mon markets, economic fusion and total economic integration have been
criticized. For instance, Salgado 3' contends that this distinction belongs to
a free market or liberalist ideology corresponding to the early European
view. 3 2 Moreover, these formulae would apply towards economies such as
those of Europe, but not to the less developed countries, which require
at least some degree of coordination of policies in order to attain their
development.
26B. Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration at 2 (1961). "Social inte-
gration can also be mentioned as a further precondition of total economic integra-
tion. Nevertheless, social integration has not been included in our definition, since--
although it increases the effectiveness of economic integration-it is not necessary
for the lower forms of integration. The removal of trade barriers in a free-trade
area, for example, is an act of economic integration even in the absence of devel-
opments in the social field." Id. at 2n.3.
GATT defines the free-trade area and customs union in article XXIV, section
8, paragraphs a and b.
27See, e.g., General Treaty of Central American Integration, Art. I and 2. For
text, sec 2 Economic Integration, supra note 1, at 385-97. See Instituto Latinoameri-
cano de Estudios Juridicos Internacionales, Instrumentos Relativos a la Integraci6n
Econ6mica en Amirica Latina 1-13 (1964) for a Spanish text.
28Supra note 22, at 8-10. With respect to the need of frontier integration, it
can be considered that national boundaries frequently introduce an artificial barrier
in an economic region whose development is impeded by the absence of a global
treatment of its problems and its possibilities. Factores, supra note 6, at 35. (Au-
thor's translation).
29 Sapra note 25 at 8, 15-16.
30d. at 8-20.
31G. Salgado, Ecuador y ha Integraci6n Econ6mica de America Latina, at 12,
16-18 (1970).
32 For differences between European and Latin American integration systems,
see, e.g., Moore, Algunas Implicaciones del Experimento de Integraci6n Europea,
Factores, supra note 6, at 73.
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Referring to the case of Latin America, Salgado proposes these
basic mechanisms in an integration system: (a) A program of liberaliza-
tion of trade of goods and the establishment of a common external tariff;
(b) harmonization of policies and common planning; and (c) common
action. These three mechanisms should take into consideration the condi.
tions of the less developed countries. He considers the abolition of re-
strictions on factor movements to be nonessential at the current stage of
economic development of the continent. Therefore, he proposes a controlled
orientation of integration. That is, more intensive participation of the
States - and of the common framework - in the integration process,
and less reliance on market methods. There are other authors who share
similar ideas.33
This kind of criticism was anticipated and accepted in some degree
by Balassa. He states that
It has been widely accepted that a higher degree of government
intervention is likely to be necessary in Latin American integration
projects. This reflects the proposition that present-day underdeveloped
countries need more state interference in economic affairs than do
advanced economies, since in the former, market incentives are
often not conducive to development. Nevertheless, the role of private
enterprise is emphasized in most discussions of Latin American
integration, and the sphere of government decision making may well
diminish as development proceeds. 34
A few years later, Balassa strongly supported the need for planning
in less developed countries.3 5 He proposed to adopt a system similar to
the French Planning Commissariat, to have some kind of governmental
intervention in monopolistic industries in some cases, and to coordinate the
activities of the organs of the State. Balassa alluded to development plan-
ning in an integration system of less developed countries when he stated:
If we accept the premise that development planning is beneficial
to underdeveloped countries, we must also conclude that coordina-
tion of their plans through a customs union will be necessary in
331d.
3+Balassa, supra note 26, at 10. Referring to Europe, Balassa fervently adheres
to the liberalist position, but even so he recognizes that "State intervention may
be stepped up in some areas, such as regional development planning, and will also
be required to deal with transitional problems."
3 SBalassa, El Desarrollo Econ6mico y la Integraci6n, Mexico, Centro de Estu-
dios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, 113-114 (1965).
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order to avoid possible conflicts. This is to say that it would be
necessary to create a supranational planning authority, and in any
event that idea is not feasible unless there is pre-existing political
unity. In my judgement, it would be more appropriate to compare
national plans in order to avoid a duplication of investment decisions
and thus clarify cost indicators and demand projections. The study
of new activities and the development of long-term projections would
help to achieve these objectives. For example, the possibilities of es-
tablishing paper and cellulose plants in Mexico, Brazil, and Chile
would be profitably served by such study because longterm projec-
tions offer directions for the future expansion of national industries) 6
Summarily, an integration system in Latin America would require
at least some degree of harmonization of national policies, and, in a
more perfect scheme, coordination of national plans and joint planning.
Among the outstanding exponents of the liberalist ideal of integration
are Maurice Allais, 37 M. A. Heilperin,3t and Wilhelm Ropke." Some of
the most important supporters of a controlled position in an integration
system are Maurice Bye,4" Andre Philip,4 1 Pierre Mendes-France,4 P.
Le Brun, 41 M. Pflimlin, 44 and also the "Club Jean Moulin. ' 45
Under close examination, the practice of Latin American integration
shows that it has not adhered completely to the liberalist philosophy. For
instance, LAFTA, which is supposed to be a free-trade association, estab-
361d. at 117 (Author's translation).
3 7Fondements Theoriques, Perspectives et Conditions de an Marchi Comun
Effective in 1 Revue d'Economie Politique 56-123. (Special ed., Jan-Feb. 1958).
38Freer Trade and Social Welfare, in 75 Integrational Labour Review 173-192
(Jan.-June 1957).
391ntegration und Desintegration der Internationalen Wirtschajt, in Wirtsehafts-
fragen der Freien Welt (Erhard-Festschrift 1957).
4OFreer Trade and Social Welfare, Comments on Mr. Heilberin's Article, 77
International Labour Review 38-47 (Jan.-June 1958).
41Social Aspects of European Economic Cooperation, in 76 International Labour
Review 244-256 (July-Dee. 1957).
4 2La Republique Moderne 133 (1962).
43Planification Democratique, Direction Moderne et Marchi Commun, (1962),
cited in J. Hackett & A. Hackett, Economic Planning in France (2d imp. 1965).
44Enterprise (July 14, 1962), cited in Id. at 331.
4 5La Planification Democratique, in Cahiers de la Republique. (January-
February 1962), cited in Id. at 332.
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lished that contracting parties "shall endeavor to promote progressively
closer coordination of the corresponding industrialization policies, and
shall sponsor for this purpose agreements among representatives of the
economic sectors concerned; and . ..may negotiate mutual agreements
on complementary economies by industrial sector."4 6 In addition, LAFIA's
resolution 100 (IV) 47 constituted a program of coordination of economic
policies. To achieve its ambitious objectives, the Andean Pact relied on
market mechanisms, a program of joint planning, and special treatment
for Bolivia and Ecuador, the less developed countries in the Andean region.
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
Planning has existed in varied forms from the days of the early
civilizations, as is shown with the case of the Inca's empire. But develop.
ment planning is a new concept that has arisen only in the last few dec-
ades. The term "development planning" implies that the government has
organized its decision-making processes so as to take account of all of the
economic and social effects of each of its acts; the total program of
action is a coherent one designed to achieve as rapid economic growth
and social development as is consistent with other national goals.48 Develop-
ment planning involves the idea that progress can be directed at man's
will and as such, it can be regarded as a recent elaboration upon the
concept of progress which only originated in the nationalistic philosophy
of the enlightenment; it is a modern idea that was not held either by the
Greeks or Romans, nor by Medieval or Renaissance Europe.49 Develop-
ment planning appeared around the 1930's, when governments began to
intervene in the economy after the crises and failures shown by the
liberalist doctrine and the social pressures exercised by the peoples.5 ° In
46Montevideo Treaty Article 16. The Spanish name for this document is "Tra-
tado de Montevideo." See 1 Economic Integration at 3-25. See Instituto Inter-
americana de Estudios Internacionales, Instrurnentos Relativos a la Integraciin
Econdmica de Amdrica Latina 177-201, for a Spanish text.
47This resolution was adopted in the fourth regular session of L.A.F.T.A.
(Bogota, Dec. 8, 1964). See 1 Economic Integration, supra note 1, at 99-116.
48This concept has been formulated based upon the one advanced by E. Hagen,
Introduction, in Planning Economic Development 1 (1963).
49J. Bury, The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry Into Its Origin and Growth
(1955).
50Roel, La Planificaci6n Econ6miea en el Per6 11-14 (1968). R. Diaz, Planea-
mientos Nacionales y Regionuales 175-176.
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1928, the Soviet Union began to issue some plans which are the ante-
cedents of its quinquennial ones.5' However, as recently as 1950, India
was the first country to have comprehensive economic development plan-
ning.' 2 Development planning reached its apogee in Latin America only
after the Charter of Punta del Este (1961),5" which established the
Alliance for Progress.
Planning is a specific form of economic policy. Hence, its success
will depend on, inter alia, the technique employed, and the economic and
social policy followed. With respect to the technique, it is necessary to
acknowledge the great importance of obtaining reliable statistics.54 This
has been illustrated by the experience of the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development during its task of applying the Marshall
Plan in Europe. 5 But this technical improvement often implies the need
for deep reforms. For instance, it is essential that the private companies
publish their financial statements, that methods exist to prevent evasion
of taxes, and that the quality of national accounts be improved.
Some economists consider planning to be incompatible with capitalist
society. Others, like Greniewski, believe that it will merely differ in the
means employed by the government to carry it out. In a socialist system
the means for planning surpass the circumstances; whereas, in a capitalist
system, the situation is the opposite. 56 Practice has rendered this dis-
cussion moot, since many countries with market economies have planning.
Therefore, the debate should deal only with the efficiency of planning in
socialist and capitalist systems.
5 7
Planning can be national and regional. Most of the authors employ
the term "regional planning" to refer to planning carried out within a
51J. Tinbergen, Central Planning 46 (1964).
52E. Hagen, Introduction, in Planning Economic Development.
S3 For text, see 2 Economic Integration, supra note 1, at 791-794. 45 Dept. State
Bull. 463-469 (1961). For Spanish text, see O.A.S .Doe. OEA/Ser. H/X.1 ES-RE-Doe.
145 Rev. 3; O.A.S. Doe. OEA/Ser. H/XII.1; Ideario y Planificacidn de la Alianza
para el Progreso 315-330 (Editorial Norte-Sur, 1962).
54 H. Jaquaribe, Coordinaci6n de las Politicas Nacionales, at 7-8.
5 5Moore, supra note 6, at 94.
56 Roel, supra note 50, at 17.
57For a general discussion on the theme, see John Hackett, A. Hackett, Eco-
nomic Planning in France 334-338. For a discussion about the French situation
regarding this point, see id. 338-354.
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State's zones. 58 Since the Andean Pact pursues a system of joint planning,
it is necessary to distinguish between national-regional and international-
regional planning, the latter being carried out within an international area.
Many organizations, governments, and private groups have been as-
sisting developing countries in the planning of economic development.5 9
Among them are the United Nations, 60 the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the
United States and other western governments, and some foundations,
private consulting firms and universities (e.g., the Development Advisory
Group of Harvard University). Some aid-giving institutions have exer-
cised pressure on recipient countries to formulate overall plans and specific
programs.6t
As stated above, development planning was popularized in Latin
America only after the Charter of Punta del Este (1961). This document
states as a basic element for achieving economic and social development,
that comprehensive and well-conceived national programs of economic
and social development, aimed at achievement of self-sustaining growth,
5SSee e.g., Regional Development and Planning: A Reader. (John Friedmann
& William Alonso eds. 1964); Regional Economic Planning; Techniques of Analysis
for Less Developed Areas. (Walter Isard & John H. Cumberland, eds.); Paris,
European Productivity Agency of the Organization for European Economic Coopera-
tion (1961).
59With respect to the situation of Africa in this respect, see P. Streeten, Aid
to Africa; A Policy Outline for the 1970's 123-129 (1972).
6OThe United Nations Committee for Development Planning was established
in March 1966 by the Economic and Social Council (E.S.C. Res. 1079 (XXIX).
U.N. Doc. E/4155, July 28, 1965) for the purpose of formulating development plans.
There is also the Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies of
the United Nations Secretariat (created pursuant to General Assembly's resolution
1708 (XVI) Planning for Economic Development: U.N. Doe. A/5056, (Dec. 19,
1961), one of whose objectives is to "ensure a unified methodological approach and
an optimum utilization of resources in work on projections and planning." Further
the United Nations has published major studies on the subject of development
planning.
For an exhaustive research in this matter, see Annotated Bibliography of Major
United Nations Publications and Documents on Development Planning, 1955-1968,
in 1 Journal of Development Planning 173-208 (1969); Annotated Bibliography of
Major United Nations Publications and Documents on Development Planning, 1969,
in 2 Journal of Development Planning 155-161 (1970).
61G. Papanek, A Plan for Planning; the Need for a Better Method of Assisting
Underdeveloped Countries on their Economic Policies, 1 Occasional Papers on
International Affairs 2 (July 1961).
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be carried out in accordance with democratic principles. 62 President Ken-
nedy thought that planning should be the essence of the Alliance for
Progress. 63 But before this Charter, the Latin American countries had
already recognized the need for planning 64 and some of them had some
experience in this regard. For instance, the Act of Bogota (1960)65 estab-
lished that "it is necessary to adequately prepare and execute plans and
programs of development-within the monetary structures, in order to
achieve success-using, in some cases the technical assistance of inter-
American and international organizations." 66
Of more importance was the Montevideo Treaty (1960) which es-
tablished the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). Its pre-
amble recognizes that "the economic development should be attained
through the maximum utilization of available production factors and the
more effective coordination of the development programs of the different
production sectors." Articles 16 and 17, for example, impose the need
of coordinating the national development plans of the members, 67 however,
these are weak provisions and this measure has never been effectuated
through LAFTA. Thus Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela have reaffirmed the need for the organi-
zation to have that coordination;68 this was one of the reasons for the
creation of the Andean Pact.
62Titte II, Chapter I, paragraph 1. For a study of planning in the Charter of
Punta del Este, see Roman Berro C., Andlisis de los Proyectos Aprobados en Fun.
cidn del Planeamiento, in Ideario y Planificaci6n de ]a Alianza para el Progreso,
supra note 53, at 437-457.
63Public Papers on the Presidents of the United States, John Kennedy (1962).
See Ideario y Planificaci6n de ]a Alianza para el Progreso, supra note 53, at 53.
6 4See generally Planning in Latin America, in Planning and Plan Implemen.
tation 20-42 (1967); Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America,
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/
102; G. Salgado, First Attempts at Planning in Latin America; Notes on an Ex-
periment; Id. at 43-67; F. Pedrao, Problems of Urban Development and Regional
Planning in Latin America in 6 Journal of Development Planning 61-91 (1974)
Committee of Development Planning, United Nations.
6 5See Ideario y Planificaci6n de ]a Alianza para el Progreso, supra note 53,
at 43-51.
6 6Chapter III, paragraph a, section II. (Author's translation.) With respect to
international technical cooperation on planning, see Id. para. c.
67R. Diaz, Planeamientos Nacionales y Regionales, supra note 50, at 174.
68Nun, Integraci6n Subregional Andina: Estudio sobre el Acuerdo de Carta-
gena, supra note 17, at 30.
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On the other hand, some Latin American countries already had some
experience with planning prior to 1961.69 This is the case of Chile with
the Promotion of Development Corporation (CORFO), a self-governing
agency (the government did not undertake itself this task because of the
unpopularity of planning within some political sectors), y0 which began
its first studies in this subject in the 1950's. There had also been regional-
national planning in the Northeast and the San Francisco Valley in Brazil,
and in the State of Caldas and the Cacan Valley in Colombia. Development
plans were formulated for these geographical areas. However, these efforts
had only limited success due to the absence of coordination with the rest
of the national economy.71
69 1t was only after the Charter of Punta del Este that the countries of the
Andean region involved themselves in comprehensive development planning. Peru
began the institutionalization of planning with the creation, on August 25, 1961, of
the Central Department of Studies and Programs ("Oficina Central de Estudios
y Programas" OCEP), an agency in charge of this matter. Ecuador already had
a planning agency, dependent on the Presidency of the Republic, and Bolivia had
a National Planning Ministry (for criticism of this Bolivian Ministry, see e.g.,
James W. Wilkies, The Bolivian Revolution und U.S. Aid Since 1952, at 38-41 (Los
Angeles, University of California Latin American Center, 1969)).
In Colombia the 1945 version of the Constitution stated that Congress had to
establish national economic plans (art. 69, no. 4). A similar provision which also
contemplates social planning was retained after the constitutional reform of 1968
(art. 76, no. 4). Only since 1950 have any real efforts been made in Colombia
for developing national planning; in that year the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development drafted the first document that could be considered a
"development plan" (Guillermo Perry R., Dessarrollo Institucional de la Planeaci6n
en Colombia 36 (1973) ). In 1959 the "Departamento Administrativo de Planeaci6n
Nacional y Servicios Tienicos" (DAP) was formed. In 1966 the "Departamento
Nacional de Planeaci6n" (DNP) was founded, see Id. at 1-38.
In Chile, Law No. 16.635--published on July 14, 1967-created the national
planning agency: "Oficina de Planificaci6n Nacional" (ODE PLAN). The main
function of ODE PLAN is to formulate the National Plan of Development that must
be proposed to the President of the Republic. ODE PLAN, through its office of
International Technical Assistance, was concerned with the Andean region even
before the Cartagena Agreement. By 1968 it had examined the promotion of inter-
change and cooperation in scientific and technological research among the countries
of the Andean zone.
Venezuela, the last nation to adhere to the Andean Pact, created on
December 5, 1958 the planning agency: "Oficina Central de Coordina-
ci6n y Planificaci6n (CORDIPLAN). In 1962 a process was initiated for greater
participation on the part of the private sector in national planning, see D. Blank,
Political Conflict and Industrial Planning in Venezuela in Venezuela 1969, Analysis
of Progress; Papers Prepared for a Conference held at Washington, D.C. (Nov.
10-11, 1969) 84-106 (P.B. Taylor, Jr. ed. 1971).
70E. Barros, Planeamientos Naeionales y Regionales, in Aspectos Legales de
la Asociaci6n Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio, supra, 168.
71B. Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration, supra note 26, at 201.
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OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE AND PLANS FOR DEVELOPMENT
Several international agencies dealing with Latin America have con-
tributed to the strength of planning in this continent, particularly the
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) of the United Nations.7
2
In addition, the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Plan-
ning (ILPES) of the United Nations has performed important work in
this regard. ECLA together with the Inter-American Development Bank,
and the Organization of American States, had jointly appointed a Com-
mittee of Nine, popularly known as the nine wise men, as the central
element in the machinery to evaluate development plans.
7
"
During the 1960's and 1970's there were a number of inter-American
resolutions specifying the role of planning in the development of the con-
tinent. For example, the Economic and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro (1965)
stated that
National development plans should take into account the market ex-
pansion resulting from regional integration, in accordance with their
own goals and objectives, in order to achieve adequate levels of
employment, stimulate investment, increase technological capacity,
and improve the conditions of cost, competition and productivity.
74
In the Declaration of the Presidents of America (1967) the relationship
between integration and national plans is described as follows: "Economic
integration is a collective instrument for accelerating Latin American de-
velopment and should constitute one of the policy goals of each of the
countries of the region. The greatest possible efforts should be made to
'bring it about, as a necessary complement to national develop-
ment plans. ' '7 5
Despite increasing consensus on the need for planning in Latin Amer-
ica, the system has serious political, 76 administrative and technical prob-
72E.C.L.A.'s studies concerning planning include: 1 Analysis and Projections
of Economic Development, entitled An Introduction to the Technique of Program-
ming, U.N. Doe. E/CN.12/363 (1955); Economic Development Planning and Inter-
national Cooperation, U.N. Doc. E/CN.12/582/Rev.1 (1961).
73E. Hagen, supra note 52, at 3.
74 Chapter V, section 30, see Economic Integration, supra note 1, at 813, for
text. This document is resolution II of the Second Special Inter-American Confer-
ence (1965).
7 5Part II, chapter I, section 1.
7 61n connection with this point, see H. Jaguaribe, supra note 33, at 152.
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lems. In addition, other elements "arising from external factors mainly
related to instability, the limited development of foreign trade, and in-
adequate conditions of external financing, are impeding the attainment
of planning targets in Latin America. '77
JOINT PLANNING
The real innovation of the Andean Pact is its reliance on the estab-
lishment of a joint planning regime, which must be achieved through a
preliminary stage of harmonization of national policies and coordination
of development plans.7 This process is carried out simultaneously and
in coordination with the formation of a regional market. Joint planning
is reached and implemented by several states observing a common strat-
egy of development. Joint planning differs from a process of coordination
of national plans in that the plans are freely established by each State
in accordance with its own economic and social policies; the national
plans are eventually harmonized with the other States' plans. There are
different degrees of coordination depending on the compatibility of each
State's economic and social policies. In Latin America, these policies
have traditionally been so deeply different that it is hardly possible to
reach higher degrees of integration relying solely on coordination.
However, joint planning is a future task and an aspiration rather
than a feasible program for the near -future. In fact, joint planning in an
integration system raises problems of supranationality since its effective
application could involve limitations on the exercise of sovereign attributes
or rights of the States which do not require their consent. Thus, it can
meet with resistance from the national governments themselves. Joint
planning is also subject to political, administrative and technical problems
which the Latin American national plans encountered. Moreover, it im-
plies a complex technical work involving the consideration of many vari-
ables. In addition, the process could be obstructed if the members do not
give prompt and reliable information about the economic and political
conditions in their countries. Although harmonization of national policies
in the Andean Pact, (a first step towards joint planning), held much
potential for higher forms of integration, it prevented further progress.
Incompatible economic policies among the parties have stalled this am-
bitious project. Perhaps this was inevitable considering the highly unstable
7 7Department of Economics and Social Affairs, supra note 56, at 28.
7 8Art. 26, Cartagena Agreement.
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political situation in the Andean region. Between 1969 and 1973 the
Andean governments differed notably in their political orientations but,
nonetheless, were able to find the way to pursue their integrative objec-
tives. Since 1974 the parties have had even greater problems in reaching
agreements until the situation evolved into crisis proportions in 1976.
Thus in 1977, the Andean Pact is only in an initial stage of harmoniza-
tion of policies. It is especially weak in the harmonization of plans where
the Convention did not establish a priority system. Although the harmoni-
zation of policies has fallen far short of initial hopes, there has been
enormous progress as compared to the situation prevailing before the Pact.
COORDINATION OF DEVELOPMENT PLANS
The process of coordination of development plans is almost non-
existent in 1977 and the slight achievements in this area are the result
of the parties' piecemeal efforts on fulfilling Andean obligations, rather
than an emphasis on a concented program of coordination. This lack
of coordination of plans prevailed in spite of the establishment of a
Planning Council in 197079 in charge of stimulating this process. The
Pact specifically considered as essential the harmonization of planning
methods and techniques in order to carry out this process.10 Nevertheless,
no agreement was reached in this respect in spite of the delicate technical
questions involved and the need for these developing countries to take
advantage of their common experiences with respect to planning. How-
ever, the Andean Pact did adopt a resolution dealing with the permanent
procedures and mechanisms necessary to achieve the harmonization of
policies and coordination of plans.5 t
The Andean Pact established that the system of joint planning must
begin within the industrial sector. To achieve this goal, the Convention
created the Sectorial Programs of Industrial Development.
As of March 1977, the parties agreed upon the following: (1) A Deci-
sion dealing with products reserved to Sectorial Programs of Industrial
79Art. 3, Cartagena Agreement. The Andean Council, the Monetary and
Exchange Council, the Financing Council, the Fiscal Council, and the Foreign
Trade Council were created by Decision 22. The Tourism Council was established
by Decision 36, while the Social Affairs Council by Decision 39. The Farming
Council was created by Decision 76.
8OArt. 26, Cartagena Agreement.
SiDecision 22. Article 29 of the Cartagena Agreement established that this
Decision had to be taken "by December 31, 1970, at the latest."
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Development,8 2 (2) A Sectorial Program of Industrial Development cover-
ing a number of metal-working operations, 3 and (3) A Sectorial Program
of Industrial Development covering the petrochemical industries.84
Compared with the Cartagena Agreement's goals, these agreements
were an extremely limited accomplishment. The approval in August 1972
of the Sectorial Program covering the metalworking sector represented
two years of negotiations.
The adoption of the program was facilitated by the fact that it
required comparatively lesser investments than other industrial sectors,
and a technology which had already developed to some extent, although
in varying degrees, among the Andean countries. The approval of the
program had been delayed precisely because of these different degrees of
industrial infrastructure, which gave occasion to another situation of
conflict between national interests and integrative goals. Ultimately, Peru
and particularly Chile accepted far lesser allocations than their infra-
structures would deserve, so as to revitalize the integration system. The
system needed the political support of President Allende and General
Velasco Alvarado. This effort showed Venezuela, which had been vacillat-
ing, that it could become a member of an effective economic scheme.
Once the Commission approved the program covering the metal-
working sector, the Board proposed programs dealing with the petro-
chemical, automotive and chemical fertilizer industries. These three proj-
ects were simultaneously considered by the Commissions which appointed
S2Decision 25.
S5Decision 57. See 16 Grupo Andino 19-26 (annex 1972). This Decision stated
that the parties had to submit to the Board technical information concerning ex-
isting production or feasibility studies concerning new production units which have
been assigned to them (art. 4). It has been thought that Decision 57 will represent
by 1980 a production of US $300,000,000 and employment for 110,000 new workers.
See 38 Grupo Andino 1, 3, 4, 5 (1974).
Decision 57 has been modified by Decision 57-a (eighth period of the Com-
mission's special meetings, Sept. 4-9, 1972). See 17 Grupo Andino 1-2 (annex 1972),
for text.
For comments on this Sectorial Program see D. Furnish & W. Atkin, The
Andean Group's Program for Industrial Development of the Metalworking Sector,
in 7 Law. Am. 61 (1975); M. Guerrero, La Programaci6n Con junta del Desarrollo
Industrial Subregional y el Primer Programa Sectorial de la Industria Metalmnecd-
nico, in 12 Derecho de la Integraci6n 35-53 (1973).
S4Decision 91. See 48 Grupo Andino 1-32 (annex 1975), for text.
85See, e.g., 36 Grupo Andino 3 (1974); 43 Grupo Andino 2 (1975); 48 Grupo
Andino 2-8 (1975).
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intergovernmental ad-hoc committees.8 6 In fact, since May 197487 the
debate about these programs occupied an important part of the discussions
among the parties. Finally, in August 1975 the petrochemical program
was approved, but the Andean countries were unable to agree upon the
approval of the other programs. The main reason for this discord was the
fact that the Sectorial Programs involve allocations in the industrial sector,
on which all the parties believe development depends. Also, the member
countries were extremely sensitive to considerations of equity and har-
monious benefit.
The automotive program was in an advanced stage of discussion, but
in the end a decision was not reached. However, the Commission in
August 197588 was able to allocate the final products and vehicles for
each country. The automotive program had encountered serious problems
due to Venezuela's desire to obtain 60 percent of the investment on the
basis of its share of the car market, while Colombia's intentions were to
apportion investment by population since it is the most populous country
with 33.82 percent of the Andean population. The case of the automotive
industry showed how politically delicate the function of the Board pro-
posing decisions to the Commission had become. In fact, its proposal for
a Program in the automotive industry was attacked by some States as
damaging their bargaining position. This criticism had some important
negative effects during the Commission's discussions. 8 9
Since July 1975, efforts have been made at the highest political level
to reactivate the Sectorial Programs of Industrial Development." In
December 1975, the Board made its Proposal 69 concerning a Program
for the electronic and telecommunication industries,91 a matter which has
yet not received sufficient attention from the parties.
The Sectorial Programs of Industrial Development require enormous
amounts of investment and a rapid development of technology. In view of
the economic condition of the Andean countries, it is highly questionable
8636 Grupo Andino 3 (1974).
87
s
8 See 48 Grupo Andino 2 (1975).
890. Amare, Interis Nacional y Control de Decisiones en un Proceso de lnte-
gracidn in 18 & 19 Derecho de la Integraci6n 40.
9OSee 47 Grupo Andino 7 (1975); 48 Grupo Andino 9-11 (1975); 51 Grupo
Andino 15 (1975); 52 Grupo Andino 5 (1975).
91See 52 Grupo Andino 3 (1975).
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whether these States can put into practical operation several programs
in a short-term period. Further, the success of the Sectorial Programs
depends on the accomplishment made in other areas of the integration
effort. In fact, they are part of a unitary scheme and the delay or non-
implementation of a single mechanism has a general effect. The Sectorial
Programs would require the effective and homogenous application of
Decision 24 on foreign investments, of the Andean multinational enter-
prises and of uniform anti-trust laws, among many other incidental
matters. The Andean Pact's goal to establish several of these Programs
at once emphasizes this requirement. Even in the metal-working program,
where there is some basic industrial infrastructure, the parties have ex-
perienced significant delays in implementation of the program due to the
irresponsible attitude of these parties, as well as the consequences of
problems resulting from internal economic structures.9 2
In accordance with Article 47 of the Cartagena Agreement, the Com-
mission could have approved programs until December 31, 1975. How-
ever, that time period has passed without the parties having a consensus,
except for the metal-working and petrochemical industries. The problem
of the Sectorial Programs must be understood in relation to the crises
faced in other aspects of the Convention, such as the disputes concerning
foreign investment, the Common External Tariff and the Liberalization
Program.
9253 Grupo Andino 17 (1976).
